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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
IN GUIDELINES SENTENCING
Susan N. Herman*
The federal sentencing guidelines may have reduced
judicial discretion over some aspects of the sentencing
process, but the experience a criminal defendant has
in sentencing still depends on the luck of the draw.
District courts have discretion to decide what
procedures to use in determining the facts on which
sentences are to be based, limited only by the appel-
late law in their circuits, and their own understanding
of the meaning of due process in sentencing. Some
district judges exercise their discretion by holding full
and careful adversarial sentencing proceedings and
employing a sufficiently demanding standard of
proof when significant facts are disputed. Others rely
reflexively on the hearsay assertions of the
presentence report, or invent ingenious ways to find
facts.'
Having surveyed the reported case law on
sentencing procedure under the guidelines, my
conclusion is that the district courts have not received
sufficient guidance from the Sentencing Commission
or from most courts of appeals on the issue of how
sentencing proceedings under the guidelines should
differ from pre-guidelines proceedings. The
Commission's commentary and most of the appellate
law on procedural issues are too vague to help a
sentencing court in determining what procedures to
require in each case.
The Sentencing Commission explicitly and
correctly recognized that although informality had
characterized sentencing before the guidelines, more
formality is "unavoidable" under the guidelines if
sentencing is to be accurate and fair.2 The Commis-
sion was not very specific about what this greater
formality might entail. The Commission did note that
adversarial sentencing hearings would be required in
some cases, and that reliance on hearsay would not
always be precluded. The Commission initially
considered addressing the issue of what burden of
proof should be used in sentencing proceedings
under the guidelines, but ultimately decided not to do
so.3 Nor did the Commission point out that although
the rules of evidence do not preclude the use of
hearsay in sentencing hearings, that does not mean
that the use of hearsay in sentencing is always
constitutional. Most importantly, the Commission
did not note that its concern that sentencing proceed-
ings be adequate and fair is more than hortatory-it is
a matter of a defendant's right under the Due Process
Clause to be sentenced on the basis of accurate
information.4 Because what is fair varies depending
on the circumstances of each case, it would have been
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difficult for the Sentencing Commission to spell out
procedural rules to govern all sentencing proceed-
ings. 5 In the end, the Commission limited its role in
settling procedural issues to some general comments
and left it to the courts to define the requirements of
due process under the guidelines.
Most of the appellate law of sentencing procedure
fails to give sentencing courts any better guidance.
Sentencing judges are rarely reversed if they do not
hold evidentiary hearings to determine disputed
facts.6 If anything, the law of most circuits encourages
district courts to believe that the requirements of due
process in sentencing proceedings under the guide-
lines can be reduced to a brief, treatise-like list of
rules, and that reversal can be avoided if those rules
are followed in each case. Virtually every court of
appeals appears to have decided, for example, that
"the" burden of proof required at sentencing proceed-
ings under the guidelines is preponderance of the
evidence.7 Few courts of appeals have recognized that
even if this is an acceptable statement as a general
rule, there will certainly be exceptions to that rule, in
cases where the preponderance standard will not
comport with the requirements of due process.
8
Similarly, few courts of appeals have recognized that
in some cases, the use of hearsay might violate
principles of the Due Process or Confrontation
Clause.'
The root of the problem in the courts of appeals
seems to be that some courts are overreading or
misapplying the principal Supreme Court cases on
procedural due process in sentencing: Williams v. New
York 10 and McMillan v. Pennsylvania." These cases are
simply not as broad as they are being interpreted to
be. Furthermore, moving from the context in which
these cases were decided-state indeterminate
sentencing systems focused on offender characteris-
tics-to the context of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines should cause any court to hesitate before
deriving broad rules from those cases and uniformly
applying those rules to proceedings under the
guidelines.
I. THE REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS AT SENTENCING
When the defendant in Williams v. New York com-
plained in 1948 that he had been denied due process
because he had not been afforded an opportunity to
cross-examine adverse witnesses, 2 the Supreme Court
found that although there is a right to confront
witnesses at the conviction phase, sentencing is a
different matter. The Court's principal reason for
distinguishing sentencing proceedings was that rules
of evidence, fashioned to find facts concerning
defendant's participation in the offense, would
unduly restrict the judicial inquiry into whether
punishment would "fit the offender and not merely
the crime." 13 The Court praised New York's progres-
sive attempt to transform the sentencing proceeding
into a more administrative, offender-oriented,
rehabilitative model, and declared its reluctance to
impose procedural requirements which might prevent
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the states from using types of information at sentenc-
ing-like defendants' prospects for rehabilitation-
which cannot appropriately be determined by trial-
type procedures.
Trial-type procedures are clearly not inappropriate
to determine most of the facts on which sentencing is
based under the guidelines. Most of these factors
concern the nature of the offense itself, and
defendant's role in the offense. Therefore, many of
the assumptions on which Williams was based do not
carry over to guidelines sentencing proceedings.
More significantly, Williams cannot today be read as a
holding that the Due Process Clause may be ignored
at sentencing. Despite its general antipathy to
assertions of procedural rights at sentencing, Williams
did not overrule the Court's earlier holding in
Townsend v. Burke14 that defendants do have due
process rights at sentencing, particularly the right to
be sentenced on the basis of accurate information.1
5
Later cases have undermined Williams by establishing
that the Due Process Clause guarantees defendants a
right to counsel at sentencing, 16 and even by cutting
into the actual holding of Williams by finding that it
may indeed deny due process for a defendant to be
sentenced on the basis of undisclosed information in a
presentence report.
7
Most importantly, the law of procedural due
process itself has undergone some major revisions
since Williams was decided in 1949, in ways which
suggest that neither the holding of Williams nor that
opinion's grudging approach to due process analysis
should apply to guidelines sentencing. Under the
Supreme Court's current doctrine, the requirements of
the Due Process Clause in a particular proceeding are
determined through a two-step analysis. As a
threshold inquiry, the Court determines whether the
individual claiming a right to certain procedures has a
"property interest" or "liberty interest" within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause. Generally
speaking, the right to be free from incarceration
constitutes a liberty interest within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause, so before the state may deprive
an individual of that freedom, it must afford that
individual due process of law. However, the Court
has held that convicted and sentenced prisoners do
not share this constitution-based "liberty interest"
because, once the state has fairly found an individual
guilty of a particular offense and imposed a sentence,
that individual forfeits his or her right to be free for
the entire period of time represented by that sen-
tence.' Therefore, if the state wishes to "return" some
part of that period of freedom, in the form of release
on parole, or good time credit, for example, the state is
free to decide what procedures to employ because the
state is not "depriving" those individuals of liberty,
but is, in fact, restoring a portion of that person's
liberty. There is an exception to this doctrine, under
which prisoners may nevertheless claim a right to due
process in decisions concerning their freedom. If the
state has created an entitlement through its positive
law, by limiting the discretion of the decisionmaker
who will grant or deny parole, for example, then the
state has created a "liberty interest" and places itself
within the ambit of the Due Process Clause once
again. Therefore, the state must comply with
whatever procedures the Court finds to be constitu-
tionally required before depriving an individual of an
entitlement to liberty.1 9
The Supreme Court has never actually discussed
whether its approach to the freedom of those already
convicted and sentenced would in fact apply to those
who have been convicted but not sentenced. Is the
right to liberty forfeited at conviction, to the full
extent of the statutory maximum sentence, or at the
sentencing proceeding, to the full extent only of the
sentence actually imposed? Williams antedated the
creation of current due process doctrine and so did
not need to address this question; the later case of
McMillan does not discuss this issue either. It is
arguable that under the structure of the federal
sentencing guidelines a defendant has not actually
been deprived by conviction of a period of freedom
equivalent to the statutory maximum sentence, and
that the actual deprivation of freedom cannot be
measured until after the defendant is sentenced.
Therefore, a defendant claiming procedural rights at
sentencing might not have to demonstrate the
creation of an entitlement, because that defendant
may be more comparably situated to an unconvicted
person than to a person who has already been
sentenced.
In any event, defendants sentenced under the
guidelines have a strong claim of right to due process
protections at sentencing no matter what the Court
might decide about the role of the sentencing
proceeding. Three Justices of the Supreme Court
have already expressly concluded that the guidelines
create an entitlement to liberty because they limit
sentencing discretion by language of a mandatory
nature. In Burns v. United States,20 a majority of the
Court found that Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure requires notice of an intended
upward departure under the guidelines, and there-
fore did not question whether such notice was
requiredl by the Due Process Clause. In a concurring
opinion, Justices Souter, Kennedy and O'Connor,
who disagreed with the majority's interpretation of
Rule 32, reached the constitutional question and
therefore needed to consider whether the guidelines
do create a liberty interest. Their conclusion that the
Due Process Clause governs sentencing proceedings
under the guidelines was apparently doubted only by
Justice Rehnquist, who did not join that section of the
opinion. It seems probable that at least two members
of the majority in that case would agree that a liberty
interest exists under the guidelines.
Therefore, courts ought to address the second step
of classic due process analysis in deciding what
procedures to employ in sentencing proceedings
under the guidelines: determining what process is
due by balancing "first, the private interest that will
be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or
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substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural require-
ment would entail."
21
If sentencing courts take seriously the conclusions
of the Sentencing Commission and the requirements
of the Due Process Clause (as expressed in Townsend
v. Burke and the string of cases applying Mathews v.
Eldridge), sentencing proceedings will indeed be more
formal in cases where significant facts are disputed.
Adversarial hearings are likely to be required more
often, whether a district court would have exercised
its discretion to hold a hearing or not. Hearsay will
not always be acceptable, because reliance on hearsay
which may significantly enhance a sentence may
violate due process principles even if the Confronta-
tion Clause is not directly applicable to sentencing
proceedings.22 And the requisite burden of proof will
vary, depending on the context of the particular case
and the impact the sentencing factor at issue will
have.23
II. McMILLAN AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF
The Court of Appeals cases which seem to suggest
that preponderance of the evidence is always the
appropriate burden in guidelines sentencing have
overread the Supreme Court's decision in McMillan v.
Pennsylvania. In McMillan, the Court held that
Pennsylvania did not deny due process to a particular
defendant by providing that he be given a mandatory
minimum sentence if the sentencing court were to
find by a preponderance of the evidence that he had
visibly possessed a weapon at the time of his offense.
The Court did not hold that the preponderance
standard would always satisfy due process.
McMillan took place in a state indeterminate
sentencing system. Federalism concerns were
reflected in the Court's desire to defer to a state
legislature's decisions about how to construct that
state's criminal justice system. I would question
whether the courts owe equal deference to the
Sentencing Commission, which is in some respects
simply another arm of the federal judicial branch.
McMillan also involves a very particular context in
which a particular type of sentencing decision was
being made. Because what was at stake in McMillan
was a minimum period of imprisonment, Pennsylva-
nia could easily have allocated that decision to the
parole authorities who would ultimately be deciding
McMillan's release date. Allowing the sentencing
judge to find the facts on which this minimum
sentence would depend actually enhanced the
procedural safeguards to which McMillan would be
entitled. The same cannot be said in guideline
sentencing, where sentences are not subject to later
review by parole authorities.
The second holding of McMillan is also subject to
being overread. McMillan had charged that the
sentencing factor at issue-visible possession of a
weapon during the offense--could and should have
been an element of the offense with which he was
charged and therefore subject to the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court rejected this
argument, holding that the state legislature does have
discretion to decide when a certain factor should be a
sentencing factor and when an element of the offense.
However, Judge Rehnquist's opinion for the majority
also noted that there must be constitutional limits on
the legislature's ability to decide to make factors
relevant only at sentencing. This limit was expressed
in a colorful metaphor: if the "tail" of the sentencing
wags the "dog" of conviction, the defendant has been
denied due process. If this is the case, merely
escalating the procedures of sentencing will be
inadequate-defendant will be entitled to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt and right to trial by jury
on all elements of the offense charged.
The Third Circuit case of United States v. Kiku-
mura,24 while not deciding the question (because the
claim had not been raised by counsel), thought that
the tail of defendant's sentence might well have
wagged the dog of conviction in a case where a
defendant was convicted of interstate transportation
of explosives and sentenced to 360 months (instead of
the presumptively applicable guideline range of 27 to
33 months) based on the government's proof at
sentencing that defendant was a member of the
notorious Japanese Red Army and had intended to
use his explosives to commit multiple murder. While
not deciding the question of whether defendant
Kikumura had been denied due process by having
these allegations raised at sentencing rather than at
trial, the Third Circuit did decide that Kikumura had
been denied due process by having facts on which so
many years of his freedom hinged decided at a
proceeding where the evidence consisted in large part
of hearsay affidavits from unnamed informants, and
where the burden of proof was no higher than
preponderance of the evidence. Requiring proof by
clear and convincing evidence, and additional
guarantees of reliability of hearsay evidence, the Third
Circuit began to forge an intermediate law of due
process at sentencing. While the calculus will not be
precisely the same in every case, the approach of
analyzing what due process requires in each case
should be the same, even in cases where the impact on
sentence is not as dramatic as the period of decades
Kikumura had at stake.
CONCLUSION
It is impossible to tell to what extent the district courts
have already accepted the expansion of sentencing
proceedings required by the guidelines and the
individualized decisions about procedure required by
the Due Process Clause. Most district court judges
report that they are already spending more time on
sentencing than they did before the guidelines. 25 But
no information is being collected that would show
how much more time sentencing judges are spending,
or how they are spending that time. Other than the
cases reflected in reported opinions, we do not know
when sentencing judges are deciding to require
hearings, disallow hearsay, or require a heightened
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standard of proof. This information would be
valuable in assessing the performance of the district
courts as well as the consequences of the guidelines.
Ideally, the Sentencing Commission, or perhaps the
Judicial Conference, should undertake some more
formal survey of the procedural implications of the
guidelines so that we can determine whether the
picture presented by reported appellate decisions
actually represents what is happening at sentencing.
If the appellate law of sentencing does accurately
reflect what district courts are doing, then measures
need to be taken-by the Commission, the Judicial
Conference or the appellate courts themselves-to
fulfill the Commission's observation that the guide-
lines require greater formality of procedure in
sentencing.
26
It is not surprising that the courts of appeals are
reluctant to require greater attention to procedure
from the district courts. The guidelines have in-
creased the amount of time appellate courts must
spend considering sentencing matters as well. In an
era when the federal courts are hard pressed to reach
their civil dockets at all, it would be surprising if the
federal courts were anxious to commit time to
conducting what sometimes seems like a second trial
in each case. My own view is that the redundancy of
factfinding in the conviction and sentencing phases
under the guidelines is an unfortunate byproduct of
Congress's decision to delegate authority over
punishment to the Sentencing Commission. Many of
the factors now being decided at sentencing could
easily be incorporated into the conviction phase. The
Sentencing Commission had no power to decide
whether or not certain of what are now sentencing
factors should have been made elements of the
appropriate offense.
Significant facts on which punishment is to be
based should be determined fairly, no matter whether
they are decided at a proceeding called a trial or a
proceeding called a sentencing. If sentencing pro-
ceedings have become unwieldy duplications of what
happened, or could have happened, at trial, the
solution is for Congress to consolidate factfinding
about the nature of the offense in one proceeding-the
trial. It is not a solution to have years of an
individual's freedom depend on haphazard
factfinding procedures simply because facts are being
found at sentencing rather than trial, or because cases
from earlier decades perceived sentencing and
conviction to be more different in substance, process
and effect than they are today.
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